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Casenote

Getting Schooled: The United
States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit Holds that the
Federal Government Need Not
Show "Good Cause" Before Settling
and Dismissing a Pending Qui Tam
Action Against College*
I. INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Everglades College, Inc.,' a case of first impression
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court
interpreted the good cause intervention requirement of § 3730(c)(3) of
Title 31 of the United States Code (U.S.C.). 2 The court was asked to

*I would like to extend my sincerest gratitude to Professor James Hunt for his advice
and guidance in the development of this Casenote. Professor Hunt's feedback and insight
throughout the research and writing process were invaluable. I would also like to thank my
family and friends for their unwavering support and encouragement during this period.
1. 855 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2017).
2. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2017). The statute reads,
If the [g]overnment elects not to proceed with the action, the person who
initiated the action shall have the right to conduct the action. If the
[g]overnement so requests, it shall be served with copies of all pleadings filed in
the action and shall be supplied with copies of all deposition transcripts (at the
[g]overnment's expense). When a person proceeds with the action, the court,
without limiting the status and rights of the person initiating the action, may
nevertheless permit the [g]overnment to intervene at a later date upon a
showing of good cause.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).
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determine whether the United States needed to show "good cause" for
intervening in a qui tam action brought by two private individuals under
the False Claims Act (FCA).3 The government, after originally declining
to proceed with the FCA action itself, eventually decided to "intervene"
while the action was pending on the appellate docket simply for the
purposes of settling with the defendant college and having the case
dismissed. 4 Relying on 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3)'s plain language and similar
decisions from sibling circuits, the Eleventh Circuit held that the United
States did not need to show "good cause" for intervening when its only
purposes were to settle with the defendant college and terminate the
6
litigation. 5 The court also approved the proposed settlement terms. In
doing so, the court recognized the differing statutory requirements and
standards guiding government actions in qui tam cases depending on
whether the United States intervenes to proceed with the action itself,
7
dismiss the action overall, or settle with the defendant. Noting these
differences, the Eleventh Circuit declined to import the good cause
intervention requirement from § 3730(c)(3) to the other sections of the
statute.8 The Eleventh Circuit's decision increases the government's
discretion in settling qui tam cases and, as a result, decreases incentives
for individuals to bring qui tam cases alleging fraudulent behavior.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In United States v. Everglades College, Inc., two former private
university employees accused the university of knowingly submitting
false claims to the United States Department of Education. Under the
Higher Education Act of 1965,9 specifically Title IV1o of the act,
undergraduate and graduate students attending eligible institutions are

3. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2017).
4. Everglades College, 855 F.3d at 1285.
5. Id. at 1286.
6. Id. at 1289.
7. Id. at 1286. The statutory requirements distinguished by the court are found in 31
U.S.C. § 3730. When the federal government chooses to proceed with a civil action for a
false claim itself, § 3730(c)(1) is the controlling section. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (2017). If the
federal government decides to dismiss the action altogether, § 3730(c)(2)(A) states the
requirements for doing so properly. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2017). Lastly, § 3730(c)(2)(B)
governs the steps the federal government must take to settle the action with the defendant,
including a fairness hearing concerning any proposed settlement agreements struck
between the involved parties. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(B) (2017).
8. Everglades College, 855 F.3d at 1286.
9. Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001-116laa (2017).
10. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070-1099d (2017).
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able to receive federally sponsored financial aid." To receive Title IV
funds, institutions of higher education must enter into "program
participation agreements"1 2 with the United States Department of
Education. These agreements condition eligibility for financial aid funds
based on compliance with various requirements.' 3 One requirement,
known as the Incentive Compensation Ban (ICB),14 prohibits institutions
from paying incentives to recruiters and admissions personnel based on
the number of students they enroll.' 5
Manuel Christiansen and Brian Ashton (Relators), two former
admissions department employees for Keiser University, brought a qui
tam action pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 372916 against Everglades College,
Inc.,' d.b.a. Keiser University (Everglades).'s The Relators alleged that
Everglades, a participant in federal student financial aid programs,
falsely certified compliance with the required program participation
agreements. Specifically, the Relators claimed Everglades knowingly
violated the ICB because admissions personnel received incentive
payments based on their successes in securing student enrollments.

11. Id.; Everglades College, 855 F.3d at 1283.
12. 20 U.S.C. §1094 (2017).
13. Everglades College, 855 F.3d at 1283.
14. 20 U.S.C. §1094(a)(20) (2017).
15. Everglades College, 855 F.3d at 1283.
16. 31 U.S.C. §3729. The statute is more commonly known as the False Claims Act.
17. In September 1990, American Flyers College was founded in Fort Lauderdale,
Florida. Arthur and Belinda Keiser purchased American Flyers College in August 1998.
The following year, the school was renamed Everglades College. In 2000, Everglades
College became incorporated as a not-for-profit corporation in the State of Florida. Two
years later, the United States Department of the Internal Revenue Service recognized
Everglades College as a not-for-profit 501(c)(3) corporation. Everglades College, Inc.
became independently operated by a board of trustees. In December 2003, Everglades
College officially changed its name to Everglades University. In 2010, the Southern
Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges accredited Everglades
University for bachelor's and master's degrees.
Everglades University is currently a regionally accredited, not-for-profit private
institution of higher education. Classes are offered both online and on-campus. The main
campus is located in Boca Raton, Florida, with additional campuses in Orlando, Sarasota,
and Tampa. Undergraduate students can earn a degree in various topics: alternative
medicine, alternative and renewable energy management, construction management,
surveying management, aviation/aerospace, crisis and disaster management, international
business, business administration, environmental policy and management, land and
energy management, and hospitality management. Graduate students can earn a degree
in business administration, aviation science, entrepreneurship, and public health
administration. ABOUT EVERGLADES, http://www.evergladesuniversity.edulabout/ (last
visited Dec. 26, 2017).
18. Everglades College, 855 F.3d at 1282.
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Because Everglades did not properly comply with its program
participation agreements, the Relators maintained that more than
230,000 claims, amounting to an estimated total of $1.2 billion in
federally funded financial aid, were illegally submitted to the
Department of Education. Consequently, the Relators contended the
university's behavior caused its students to unknowingly submit claims
for federal financial aid, also violating the ICB. Therefore, according to
the Relators, Everglades was liable for both its own express false
certifications of compliance and the enormous volume of studentsubmitted claims.19
When the Relators initiated their action against Everglades pursuant
to 31 U.S.C. § 3730,20 the United States initially declined to intervene
and take over the case. 21 Thus, exercising their statutory rights under
§ 3730(b)(1)22 and (b)(4)(B), 23 the Relators pursued the case on behalf of
the United States. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida found that Everglades
violated the ICB.24 However, the district court severely limited the
monetary benefits of this finding to the Relators in three ways. First, the
district court rejected the Relators' theory that each student-submitted
financial aid claim was an actionable FCA claim because Everglades
could not control the content, number, or submission of studentsubmitted financial aid claims. Second, the district court found that
Everglades' top policymakers did not become aware of the ICB violation
scheme until November 20, 2009. After this date, Everglades knowingly
submitted two falsified certifications of compliance to the Department of
Education. Therefore, Everglades was liable only for those two false
claims, compared to the alleged amount of approximately 230,000 claims,
and the district court awarded the Relators the minimum statutory
penalty of $5,500 per violation. Lastly, the district court rejected the
Relators' argument that the federal government's damages were equal to
the value of all educational assistance paid to Everglades during the
period covered by the false certifications. The district court reasoned the
Department of Education would not have demanded reimbursement for
the already-paid Title IV funds even if Everglades had disclosed its ICB

19. Id. at 1282-83.
20. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2017). The statute regulates civil actions for false claims in
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729. Id.
21. Everglades College, 855 F.3d at 1282.
22. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2017).
23. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B) (2017).
24. Everglades College, 855 F.3d at 1283.
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violations. 25 Thus, the Relators were entitled to only $11,000 in penalties
against Everglades and no damages. 26
Disappointed in the district court's limited award, 27 the Relators
appealed the decision to the Eleventh Circuit. While the appeal was
pending on the Eleventh Circuit's docket, and after the Relators' opening
brief was filed, the United States commenced settlement negotiations
with Everglades. 28 Then, before the United States moved to formally
intervene in the Relators' qui tam action, the United States reached a
tentative settlement with Everglades. It provided that the university
would pay the United States $335,000 in exchange for being released
from any further administrative or civil claims concerning the Relators'
qui tam action. Additionally, the agreement provided that the United
States would refrain from suspending or terminating Everglades'
eligibility for any future Title IV funds based on the Relators' action. 29
Although the Relators' appeal was pending when the tentative
settlement was struck, the United States moved the district court for an
indicative ruling. In doing so, the United States asked the district court
to permit its intervention and approve the tentative settlement once the
district court reacquired jurisdiction on remand from the Eleventh
Circuit. The district court issued the requested indicative order,
reasoning the United States could intervene and the $335,000 settlement

25. Id. at 1283-84.
26. Id. at 1282.
27. After the bench trial in the district court, but before the settlement, the Relators
asked for over $1 million in attorney's fees and approximately $76,000 in litigation costs.
However, in light of their limited success at trial, the district court reduced both the
attorney's fees award to $60,000 and the litigation costs award to $27,000. Everglades, 855
F.3d at 1285. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's reduced amounts. Id. at
1294. Thus, at the time of the appeal, the Relators were set to receive only $87,000 ($98,000
total after including the $11,000 in awarded penalties). In looking at the amount, it is
important to remember that at the district court's bench trial, the Relators argued that the
defendants had caused more than $1 billion in federal student financial aid claims to be
filed while the university filed false certifications of compliance with the Department of
Education. Id. at 1283.
28. Everglades College, 855 F.3d at 1284. The Relators and their legal counsel were
excluded from the settlement negotiations. The United States explained that it excluded
the Relators from its direct negotiations with Everglades College because "[the] Relators'
confidence of appellate reversal and adamant demand for billions of dollars would have
impeded productive settlement negotiations." The United States did however invite the
Relators' counsel to meet and discuss the proposed settlement, but only after striking a
tentative deal with Everglades College. The Relators' counsel accepted the invitation and
explained his objection to the notion of settling while the case was pending appeal.
Notwithstanding this objection, the United States decided to go forward with its settlement
agreement and intervened in order to dismiss the action. Id. at 1291.
29. Id. at 1291.
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was fair and reasonable since it far exceeded the $11,000 won by the
Relators. Because of the indicative ruling, the Eleventh Circuit
remanded the case back to the district court. The district court then
formally granted the United States' motion to intervene, which was made
for the purposes of obtaining court approval of the tentative settlement
and dismissing the qui tam action. 30 As statutorily required under
§ 3730(c)(2)(B),3 1 the district court scheduled a hearing to confirm
whether the United States' proposed settlement with the defendant
university was fair, reasonable, and adequate. After the fairness hearing,
the district court approved the settlement and dismissed the Relators'
qui tam action with prejudice. 32
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Higher EducationAct of 1965
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Higher Education Act of 1965
(HEA) into law on November 8, 1965 in the gymnasium at Southwest
Texas State College, his alma mater. Symbolically, President Johnson
signed the bill sitting at the same desk he used while a student working
as a secretary to the university's president. During his time in college,
President Johnson also worked as a janitor on campus to supplement the
loan he obtained to finance his tuition. With his penurious collegiate
background in mind, President Johnson hoped the HEA would remove
any financial barriers for academically qualified students. 33
The HEA was one of the most important pieces of President Johnson's
Great Society legislation. It aimed to broaden educational opportunities
for all Americans, leading to higher incomes for families, decreased
poverty rates, and a prosperous country with a steady supply of educated
individuals. One of the most significant components of the HEA was the
creation of federal student aid programs under Title IV. 34 The purpose of
Title IV, as originally stated in § 401(a), 35 was to provide "educational
opportunity grants to assist in making available the benefits of higher
education to qualified high school graduates of exceptional financial
need, who for lack of financial means of their own or of their families

30. Id.
31. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B).
32. Everglades College, 855 F.3d at 1284-85.
33. TG RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL SERVICES, OPENING THE DOORS To HIGHER
EDUCATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT 40 YEARS LATER 1 (2005).

34. Id. at 17.
35. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329,
(1965).

§

401(a), 79 Stat. 1219, 1232
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would be unable to obtain such benefits without such aid." 36 The HEA
established a federal role in providing post-secondary students with
need-based grants, work-study opportunities, and loans to students
willing to invest in themselves.37
To be considered an eligible institution for the purposes of its students
receiving federal financial aid under the HEA and its Title IV,
universities and colleges must comply with various requirements. Initial
and continuing eligibility for participating in federal student financial
assistance programs mandates that institutions of higher education
enter into and comply with program participation agreements. 38 Of
particular importance, § 1094(a)(20), known as the ICB, prohibits
institutions from providing its admissions staff with any commission,
bonus, or other incentive payment based on success, or lack thereof, in
securing student enrollments. 39 This ban was enacted based on evidence
of serious program abuses. Implementation of the ICB is designed to curb
the risk that recruiters, in an effort to win trips, gift cards, or paid
vacation days, will enroll under-qualified students who will gain little
benefit from a post-secondary institution and may be unable or unwilling
40
to repay the federal loans borrowed to attend.

B. A Brief History of Qui Tam and its Survival in the United States
Qui tam is shortened from the Latin phrase, "qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro se ipso in hacparte sequitur," meaning "who pursues this action
on our Lord the King's behalf as well as his own." 41 According to this
common law civil action, private persons (denominated "relators" in
American law) may bring a qui tam civil action for themselves and for
the United States against an alleged fraudulent defendant on behalf of
the government. 42 In doing so, both the relator and the government, the
party that is actually harmed, may share in the rewards of any penalty,
43
damages, or settlement recovered from the fraudulent defendant.

36. Id.
37. TG RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL SERVICES, supra note 33, at 1.
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a).

39. 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(20).
40. United States v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 2006).
41. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1
(2000).
42. Id. at 769.
43. Jonathan T. Brollier, Mutiny of the Bounty: A Moderate Change in the Incentive
Structure of Qui Tam Actions Brought under the False Claims Act, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 693,
698 (2006).
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Qui tam actions originated in England at common law around the end
of the thirteenth century allowing private individuals who had suffered
an injury to bring actions in the royal courts on both their own and the
Crown's behalf.44 Originally, qui tam actions were sometimes the only
way a private individual could get his claims heard in the royal courts,
which generally were limited to matters exclusively involving the
Crown's interest. Eventually, however, beginning in the fourteenth
century, the royal courts started to extend jurisdiction to suits involving
wholly private wrongs causing qui tam actions to gradually fall into
disuse but technically remain available. 45 At the same time, despite the
decline in use, Parliament began enacting statutes that expressly
provided for qui tam litigation. One type of statute, appropriately named
informer statutes, allowed informers to obtain a portion of the penalty
dealt as a reward for their information, even if they themselves suffered
no injury. 46 In essence, this form of qui tam action was a mode of
privatized law enforcement. 47 Highly subject to abuse due to predatory
and professional informers, informer statutes created great opposition to
the use of qui tam actions. 48 Therefore, many of the old enactments were
repealed or made limited in the following centuries. 49 In 1951,
Parliament repealed all remaining laws allowing qui tam suits.5 0
The qui tam tradition, like much of the English common law, was
passed on to the United States.51 Although qui tam enforcement has
never been as widespread in the United States as it once was in England,
qui tam survives in America despite having been completely abolished in
England-perhaps because of a greater distrust of government and its

44. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 774.
45. Id. at 774-75.
46. Id. at 775.
47. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, REN9E LETTOw LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HIsTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 222 (Wolters

Kiuwer Law & Business, 2d ed. 2009). By providing incentives for informers to investigate
and prosecute violators, a skeletal government could enforce economic and other
regulations without an expensive police force or prosecutorial corps. Id.
48. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 775; Brollier, supra note 43, at 698.
49. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 775-76.
50. Brollier, supra note 43, at 698-99. Interestingly, this was done following the
concern that an enterprising informer may resurrect an eighteenth-century prohibition on
serving alcohol on Sundays in order to challenge His Majesty's 100th Anniversary of the
Great Exhibition of 1851. Id.
51. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 776.
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leaders. 52 Immediately after the framing of the United States
Constitution, the First Congress enacted a considerable number of
informer statutes. 53 Despite the availability of qui tam actions under
surviving statutory provisions, only the False Claims Act has produced a
large amount of federal qui tam cases. 54

C. The False Claims Act and Civil Actions for its Violation
The purpose of the False Claims Act (FCA) is to enhance the
government's ability to recover losses resulting from fraudulent behavior
taken against the government.5 5 In turn, the FCA imposes civil liability
on any defendant who "knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or
used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim"
to the federal government.5 6
In 1863, Congress enacted the FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, midway through
the Civil War in response to widespread fraud and deception on the part
of military contractors. The original FCA was specifically designed,
through its inclusion of qui tam provisions, to combat fraud and false
claims by commissioning private citizens to bring wrongdoings to light.
In return for their diligence, relators were allowed to collect up to onehalf of the total amount recovered from the fraudulent defendant.5 7
The FCA's qui tam provisions remained in force until abuses by
relators during World War Il led to their restriction and near-abolition.5 8
The Supreme Court's holding in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess5 9
triggered the statute's phasedown.6o There, the defendants were
electrical contractors hired to work on Public Works Administration
projects in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and were subsequently indicted by
the government on a bid-rigging conspiracy. 61 Upon discovering the
government had already made a case for him, a sly relator copied the
allegations stemming from the government's indictment into his own

52. J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradicationof Qui Tam
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 553 (2000); HIstORY OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 47,
at 223.
53. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 776.
54. Beck, supra note 52, at 555.
55. Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., LLC, 397 F.3d 925, 930 (10th Cir. 2005).
56. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (2017).
57. Beck, supra note 52, at 555-56; Brollier, supra note 43, at 699.
58. Beck, supra note 52, at 556.
59. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
60. Beck, supra note 52, at 556.
61. Id.; Marcus, 317 U.S. at 539.
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FCA qui tam suit and obtained a judgment in his favor for $315,000.62
The Court upheld the judgment finding the relator was within his rights
to bring suit even though the government had explicit knowledge
concerning the fraud.63 Thus, in 1943, along with several other
restrictions, Congress amended 31 U.S.C. § 3729 to deprive courts of
jurisdiction over any qui tam suit built upon information or evidence
already possessed by the government. 64
In 1986, Congress once again found itself amending the FCA in
response to a series of scandals involving excessive prices paid by the
government for items procured from defense contractors.65 This time,
however, the amendments strengthened the reach of the FCA, producing
a qui tam revival.66 The 1986 amendments created increased monetary
incentives for relators to bring qui tam suits and granted the government
greater control over these privately brought actions.67
Today, under 31 U.S.C. § 3730, a FCA action may be commenced in
one of two ways.68 First, the government, through the Attorney General,
may bring a civil action against a person who has violated, or is violating,
§ 3729.69 Second, a relator may bring a civil action for a violation of § 3729
for the relator and the government, in the name of the government. 70
When a relator initiates an FCA qui tam action, the guidelines set
forth in 31 U.S.C. § 3730 must be strictly followed. First, the relator must
serve a copy of the complaint and any material evidence and information
on the government. Then, within sixty days after receiving the complaint,
the government may choose to intervene and proceed with the action
itself.71 If the government elects to intervene and proceed within the
stated time frame, it will have primary responsibility for prosecuting the
action and will not be bound by any act of the relator. 72
Alternatively, the government may decide to either dismiss or settle
the action. The government may dismiss the action notwithstanding

62. Beck, supra note 52, at 556.
63. Marcus, 317 U.S. at 548.
64. Beck, supra note 52, at 560.
65. Id. at 561. In some instances, for example, the Department of Defense was charged
$435 per hammer, $640 for a toilet seat cover, and $7,622 for a coffee maker. The national
media became aware of these prices and helped to generate pressure on Congress through
high-profle expos6s. Id.
66. Id. at 561-63.
67. Id.; Ridenour, 397 F.3d at 931.
68. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 769.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2017).
72. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1).
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objections from the relator if the government notifies the relator that it
filed a dismissal motion. After doing so, the court must provide the
relator with an opportunity for a hearing on the motion.73 Subsection
(c)(2)(A) is silent as to the standard behind granting a government
motion to dismiss a qui tam action.7 4 Nevertheless, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
§ 3730(c)(2)(A) confers on the government "an unfettered right to
dismiss" qui tam claims. The D.C. Circuit also stated the only function of
a dismissal hearing is to provide the relator a formal opportunity to
convince the government not to end the case. 75 As another option, the
government may choose to settle the action notwithstanding the relator's
objections only if the court determines, after a statutorily mandated
hearing, that the government's proposed settlement is "fair, adequate,
and reasonable under all the circumstances."76 Judicial review and
approval of a proposed settlement is necessary for it to become effective.
Otherwise, the settlement will remain a proposal. 77
Finally, the government may elect not to prosecute, dismiss, or settle
the action after the relator files a qui tam complaint. Instead, the
government may notify the court that it declines to take over the action
before the end of the sixty-day period. In this scenario, the relator
acquires the right to conduct the litigation.7 8 However, once the relator
proceeds with the action, the court, without limiting the status and rights
held by the relator, may still permit the government to "intervene at a
later date upon a showing of good cause."7 9
If found guilty, a fraudulent defendant is liable for damages and civil
penalties of no less than $5,000, but no more than $10,000, per falsified
claim.80 In keeping with the monetary incentives created by the 1986
FCA amendments, a relator bringing a qui tam action stands to recover
no matter what path the government chooses to take. If the government
proceeds with the action, the relator will receive at least 15% but no more
than 25% of the proceeds of the litigation or settlement of the claim.81 If

73. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
74. Ridenour, 397 F.3d at 935.
75. United States ex rel. Schweizer v. Oc6 N.V., 677 F.3d 1228, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(quoting Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 252-54 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
76. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B).
77. Schweizer, 677 F.3d at 1234.
78. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b)(4)(B), (c)(3).
79. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).
80. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2017).
81. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2017). The percentage range is dependent upon the extent
to which the relator substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action. Id.
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the government opts not to proceed with the action, the relator who
litigates or settles the claim will receive at least 25% but no more than
30% of the proceeds. 82
IV. COURT'S RATIONALE
In United States v. Everglades College, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit
analyzed each relevant subsection of 31 U.S.C. § 3730 in determining the
proper requirements for government intervention in FCA qui tam
actions. The Eleventh Circuit determined a straightforward reading of
§ 3730 supported its finding that the United States did not need to satisfy
the good cause intervention requirement found in § 3730(c)(3) because
here, the United States settled and sought to dismiss the case instead of
"intervening" for the purpose of continuing the litigation. 83
First, the court interpreted subsection (b)(2) to expressly link the
concept of intervention to the government's decision to literally "proceed
with the action." 84 Next, the court read neither subsections (c)(2)(A) nor
(c)(2)(B) as being conditioned upon what the court defined as formal
intervention by the government. That is, intervention intended to
proceed with the litigation and not merely to end it. Rather, these
subsections, respectively, allow the government to dismiss or settle qui
tam actions notwithstanding the relator's objections.85 If the government
dismisses the action, the relator is only provided with an opportunity for
a hearing on the motion to dismiss. 86 If the government settles with the
defendant, the court is required only to have a fairness hearing on the
proposed settlement.8 7 Therefore, the court declined to import the goodcause requirement for government intervention from subsection (c)(3)
into the subsections governing government dismissals and settlements.8 8
The court relied on decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Tenth Circuit to
further support its conclusion.89

82. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2017). The percentage range is dependent upon what the
court decides is a reasonable amount for collecting the civil penalty and damages. Id.
83. Everglades College, 855 F.3d at 1285-87.
84. Id. Section 3730(b)(2) reads, 'The Government may elect to intervene and proceed
with the action within [sixty] days after it receives both the complaint and the material
evidence and information." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
85. Everglades College, 855 F.3d at 1286.
86. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
87. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B).
88. Everglades College, 855 F.3d at 1286.
89. Id.; United States ex rel. Schweizer v. Oc6 N.V., 677 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2012);
Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp.,
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In deciding Everglades College, the Eleventh Circuit cited two
decisions hailing from the D.C. Circuit: United States ex rel. Schweizer v.
Ocj N.V. 90 and Swift v. United States.9 1 In Schweizer, the D.C. Circuit
closely analyzed subsections (c)(2)(A) and (c)(2)(B) in response to the
relator's appeal from the lower court's decision to decline review of a
proposed settlement between the United States and the defendant
corporation. 92 There, the lower court reasoned that subsection (c)(2)(A)
gave the government "an unfettered right to dismiss" qui tam actions and
declared (c)(2)(B) a "dead letter."9 3 On appeal, as a preliminary matter,
the relator claimed the government had no right to invoke subsection
(c)(2)(A) because the government never properly intervened in the case
and therefore, was never a true party to the suit. The relator argued the
government never became a true party to the suit because the
government (1) declined to intervene during the initial sixty-day period
as allowed under subsection (b)(4) and (2) did not invoke subsection (c)(3)
by showing good cause for filing at a later date. 94 The D.C. Circuit held
the relator's interpretation of 31 U.S.C. § 3730's intervention provisions
as inaccurate, declaring intervention was necessary only if the
government wished to proceed with the qui tam litigation. There, the
government intervened to settle with the defendant corporation and end
litigation.95 However, the D.C. Circuit agreed with the relator that the
lower court erred in denying her a fairness hearing on the proposed
settlement.96 Similarly, in Swift, the D.C. Circuit analyzed subsection
(c)(2)(A) in response to the relator's appeal on the ground that the
government could not move to dismiss her qui tam action without first
properly intervening.9 7 Once again, the court held that the language in
subsection (c)(2)(A) does not require the government to intervene in order
to seek dismissal and end the action because subsection (b)(2) makes
formal intervention necessary only if the government wishes to proceed
with the action itself.98

252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001); Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., LLC, 397 F.3d 925 (10th Cir.
2005).
90. 677 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
91. 318 F.3d 250 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
92. Shweizer, 677 F.3d at 1232.
93. Id.

94. Id. at 1233.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1233-35.
97. Swift, 318 F.3d at 251.
98. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit also relied on Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal

Hospital9 9 and Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., LLC. 100 In Riley, the Fifth

Circuit analyzed the many mechanisms available in § 3730 allowing the
government to retain control over a qui tam action throughout the entire
litigation process.101 In particular, the court highlighted that even if the
government never intervenes, it is still allowed to settle the action over
the relator's objections as long as the relator is provided with both notice
and a hearing. 102 In Ridenour, the Tenth Circuit, relying on Swift,
affirmed that the government did not need to formally intervene before
moving to dismiss a qui tam action. 103
In Everglades College, because the Eleventh Circuit determined the
United States' actions were for the narrow purpose of settling the qui tam
action, the court then turned to the text of subsection (c)(2)(B) and
described the proper standard for approving or rejecting proposed
settlements between the government and a defendant in a FCA case. 104
Here, the Relators asked the court to review the proposed settlement
under the same standard used for class action suits under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23.105 Specifically, Rule 23(e)(2)106 states, "[i]f the
proposal would bind class members, the court may approve it only after
a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate." 107 In
deciding the fairness of Rule 23 settlements, the Eleventh Circuit
considers (1) the likelihood of success at trial, (2) the range of possible
recovery, as well as (3) the complexity and expense of the litigation, and
(4) the stage of the proceedings at which the settlement is reached
without giving deference to the settling parties. 108
In response, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Relators' request and
stated that a qui tam FCA suit substantially differs from class action
suits in two ways. First, a relator has suffered no invasion of his own
personal rights. Instead, the relator is bringing the qui tam action on
behalf of the government, which it believed to have been injured and is
the real party of interest to the action. Thus, when the government
settles a qui tam case, it is agreeing to compromise with respect to its

99. 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001).
100. 397 F.3d (10th Cir. 2005).
101. Riley, 252 F.3d at 753-55.

102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 754.
Ridenour, 397 F.3d at 933.
Everglades College, 855 F.3d at 1287.
Id.

106. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (2017).
107. Id.

108. Everglades College, 855 F.3d at 1287.
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own injuries and not those of the relator or any other absent party. 1o
Second, in a qui tam suit, the government is not mainly concerned with
maximizing recovery against the defendant. On the contrary, the
government considers whether the maximum recovery is proportional to
the seriousness of the misconduct, potential public policy consequences,
political ramifications, and if continued monitoring of the case is worth
spending limited prosecutorial resources.1 10 Additionally, it is important
to differentiate and note that in reviewing a settlement agreement in a
qui tam FCA suit, considerable deference must be given to the
government's rationale underlying the settlement.11 1 While courts must
give respect to the government's settlement rationale, courts "cannot just
rubber stamp the government's justifications." 1 1 2 Therefore, unlike Rule
23 standards, under subsection (c)(2)(B), courts must merely find the
settlement is "fair, adequate, and reasonable."1 1 3
In applying the qui tam standard to the Everglades settlement, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded the proposed agreement was fair, adequate,
and reasonable. 114 According to the court, the United States provided
sensible rationales for settling the Relators' action. Most importantly,
since the district court found that Everglades was only liable for two false
claims, the United States believed an appeal was risky due to the chance
the Eleventh Circuit would affirm the district court's narrow
interpretation of FCA liability. If the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on
appeal, the government's FCA enforcement efforts would be impaired in
the circuit. The United States considered the precedential impact a
potentially adverse appellate decision concerning the enforcement efforts
would have on monetary recoveries for future FCA violations. If the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, the government
and future relators would receive substantially lower recovery
amounts.115 Also, the United States preferred the certainty of a
settlement compared to the uncertainty of an appeal in light of the fact
that the Relators' case partially hinged on a proposition not yet settled in
the Eleventh Circuit. The question of whether an educational institution

that is violating 20 U.S.C. § 1094 can be held liable under the FCA for

109. Id. at 1287-88.
110. Id. at 1288.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1288-89.
113. Id. at 1288 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B)). Implicit in this rule is a broad
recognition of the government's power and authority to enforce federal law.
114. Id. at 1289.
115. Id.
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student-submitted financial aid requests remains undecided in the
Eleventh Circuit.11 6
Lastly, the court looked to the Relators' potential monetary recovery
in accord with § 3730(d)(1). Here, the proposed settlement agreement the
United States struck with Everglades yielded a recovery amount more
than thirty times the amount recovered by Relators at trial in the district
court. Therefore, both the United States and the Relators secured a
117
higher recovery, making the settlement fair and reasonable.
V. IMPLICATIONS

Since its amendment in 1986, actions filed pursuant to the FCA have
steadily increased, enabling the government to recover billions from
deceptive defendants. 118 Interestingly, the amount of qui tam actions
filed under the FCA is also ever growing. In 1988, a total of 253 fraud
claims were brought overall and 43 of these were qui tam actions.
Altogether, the fraud claims allowed the government to recover
approximately $175 million, with roughly $2.3 million won from the qui
tam cases. 119 In comparison, in 2016,120 a total of 845 FCA claims were
brought and 702 of these were qui tam claims. These fraud claims
allowed the government to recover approximately $4.76 billion that year.
Approximately $2.9 billion of the total amount was won in the sizeable
number of qui tam actions. 121 In recent decades, a large quantity of fraud
lawsuits, non-qui tam and qui tam, have been directed specifically at the
122
health and human services industry and the Department of Defense.
However, fraudulent behavior accusations have been pointed towards
123
including the housing and
other industries and departments too,

mortgage industry, United States Customs, the Department of the
Interior, and-of particular importance to this Note-for-profit
schools.124

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Beck, supra note 52, at 541-43, 638.
119. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7 Billion
From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec. 14, 2016) (on file with Author);
FRAUDs STATISTICS, http://www.justice.gov/opalpress-releaselfile/918361/download (last
visited Dec. 30, 2017).
120. The information listed for 2016 is calculated through September 30, 2016.
Therefore, the amounts may differ slightly for the year's entirety.
121. Press Release, supra note 119; FRAUDS STATISTICS, supra note 119.
122. Id.
123. FRAUDS STATISTICS, supranote 119.
124. Id.
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In 2015, for example, the second largest for-profit education company
in the United States, Education Management Corporation (EDMC), paid
the government $95.5 million 25 to settle four separate FCA lawsuits filed
under the act's qui tam provision. In their qui tam cases, the relators
alleged that EDMC violated FCA provisions by certifying compliance
with Title IV of the HEA despite blatant abuse of its ICB provision. 126
The government intervened in one of these cases, United States ex rel.
Washington v. Education Management Corp.,'127 and found EDMC was
running a high-pressure sales business where its recruiters were paid
based solely on the number of students they enrolled for more than ten
years. 128 EDMC pursued an enrollment-maximization strategy and
accepted all potential students who completed an application regardless
of their high school grades or the quality of their written essay.1 29 In
response to the settlement, United States Department of Education
Secretary Arne Duncan stated, "This settlement should be a warning to
other career colleges out there: We will not stand by while you profit
illegally off of students and taxpayers. The federal government will
continue to work tirelessly with state attorneys general to ensure that all
colleges follow the law." 30
However, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Everglades College, does
not seem to support the same policy articulated in Secretary Duncan's
quote. Despite the nationwide increase of qui tam actions during the past
thirty years and the huge monetary amounts recovered by the relators,

125. The United States is to receive $52.62 million from the settlement and the
remaining $11.3 million will be divided between the co-plaintiff states (California, Florida,
Illinois, and Indiana), the relators, and their counsel in the four qui tam cases. Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, For-Profit College Company to Pay $95.5 Million to Settle
Claims of megal Recruiting, Consumer Fraud and Other Violations (Nov. 16, 2015) (on file
with Author).
126. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, For-Profit College Company to Pay $95.5
Million to Settle Claims of Illegal Recruiting, Consumer Fraud and Other Violations (Nov.
16, 2015) (on file with Author). EDMC, headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
operates hundreds of higher education institutions throughout the United States and
enrolls over 100,000 students. These institutions are more commonly known as the Art
Institutes, South University, Argosy University, and Brown-Mackie College. Id.
127. 871 F. Supp. 2d 433 (W.D. Pa. 2012).
128. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supranote 125.
129. 871 F. Supp. 2d at 439-40. The annual student aid funds received by EDMC
increased from $656 million in 2003-2004 to $2.578 billion in 2010-2011. Id. Institutions
of higher education pursue this strategy because the students and taxpayers, not the
educational institutions, absorb the risk of defaults on student loans. Therefore, there is
little economic incentive to limit student enrollment and institutions set some students up
for failure. Id.
130. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supranote 125.
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qui tam actions involving fraudulent behavior by institutions of higher
131
education no longer seem as appealing in the Eleventh Circuit.

Laura Leigh Fox

131. Attorneys for relators now have reduced incentives to pursue FCA claims against
universities that defraud the government. In Everglades, the Relators' attorneys filed the
original complaint in February 2012. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 22, United States v.
Everglades College, Inc., 855 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-10849) (filed Aug. 22, 2016).
After five years of extensive research, drafting legal documents, performing depositions,
filing motions, attending court hearings, and winning a judgment in the trial court, the
government belatedly stepped in and settled the case while it was pending on the appellate
court's docket. Id. at 28. In its response brief, the government indicated its fear that if the
Relators' theory of liability gained traction in the appellate court, it could have devastating
financial implications to Everglades' ability to run its institution. Response Brief of
Appellee at 29, United States v. Everglades College, Inc., 855 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2017)
(No. 16-10849) (filed Oct. 11, 2016). The government is basing its argument off 34 C.F.R.
§ 668.86(a), which provides that an institution's participation in Title IV or HEA programs
may be limited if the institution violates an applicable regulatory provision. Id. The
government was mainly concerned because the district court found Everglades had violated
the ICB and therefore Everglades risked its eligibility to receive future Title IV funding, to
participate in HEA programs going forth, and to continue operating efficiently. Id.
Therefore, the government wanted the district's court decision finding the government's
settlement was "fair, reasonable, and adequate" to be confirmed by the Eleventh Circuit.
Id. at 28. The government's settlement was substantially more than the Relators recovered
while adjudicating the case in the district court. Yet it seems to approve a very low standard
for government settlements. The Relators strongly believed Everglades fraudulently
received millions from the government and actually proved to the district judge's
satisfaction violations of federal law. Yet, not only did the government settle for less than
half a million, but also it did so partly in order to make sure Everglades could continue to
operate.

